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I looked, and there was a pale green horse. Its rider was 
named Death, and Hades accompanied him. They were given 
authority over a quarter of the earth, to kill with sword, 
famine, and plague, and by means of the beasts of the earth.1 
I. HEARING THE HOOVES OF THE ECOLOGICAL APOCALYPSE 
Life on earth overcomes mass extinction events on a temporal 
scale spanning millions of years. By this measure, “the loss of genetic 
and species diversity” is probably the contemporary crisis “our 
 * Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School <chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu>. This paper benefited from a faculty 
workshop on April 17, 2003, at the University of Minnesota Law School. Daniel A. Farber, 
Alexandra Glynn, Gil Grantmore, Jamie A. Grodsky, David McGowan, and Susan M. Wolf 
provided helpful comments. Special thanks to Kathleen Chen. 
 This Article was originally published in book form. See THE JURISDYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 197 (Jim Chen ed., 2003). It is reprinted here with the kind permission of the publisher, 
he Environmental Law Institute.  t 1. Revelation 6:8 (New American Bible). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/3
p 12 Chen book pages.doc  3/29/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:12 
 
 
descendants [will] most regret” and “are least likely to forgive.”2 
Biodiversity loss is the “scientific problem of greate[st] immediate 
importance for humanity.”3 If indeed biodiversity loss has reached 
apocalyptic proportions, it is fitting to describe the engines of 
extinction in equine terms. Jared Diamond characterizes the deadly 
horsemen of the ecological apocalypse as an “Evil Quartet” 
consisting of habitat destruction, overkill, introduced species, and 
secondary extinctions.4 Edward O. Wilson prefers an acronym 
derived from the Greek word for horse. HIPPO represents Habitat 
destruction, Invasive species, Pollution, Population, and 
Overharvesting.5 Although conservation biologists have identified the 
leading causes of biodiversity loss, legal responses to the crisis do not 
address distinct sources of human influence on evolutionary change. 
Not surprisingly, legal scholarship tends to ignore the distinctions 
among causes of biodiversity loss. This Article takes a modest step 
toward remedying at least the latter shortcoming. 
Such “environmental and land-use ethics” as are codified in law 
today stem from an “era when the human population, at one-tenth its 
present size, tamed wilderness with axe and ox.”6 Before the rise of 
Neolithic agriculture and the spread of sedentary human settlements 
across much of the globe, Wilson’s deadly HIPPO took the reverse 
sequence: OPPIH. The transmogrification of OPPIH to HIPPO over 
time frames the human impact on evolution in historical as well as 
biological terms. In Paleolithic times, the overharvesting of large 
mammals and flightless birds had a greater ecological impact than 
what was then “a still proportionately small amount of habitat 
destruction.”7 In North America, for instance, the sudden 
 
 2. Toward a Lasting Conservation Ethic: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Envtl. Pollution, 
97th Cong. 366 (1981) (statement of Edward O. Wilson, Baird Professor of Science, Harvard 
niversity). U 3. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 254 (1992).  4. See Jared Diamond, “Normal” Extinctions of Isolated Populations, in EXTINCTIONS 191 
(Matthew H. Nitecki ed., 1984); Jared Diamond, Overview of Recent Extinctions, in 
CONSERVATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 39–41 (David Western & Mary C. Pearl 
ds., 1989). e 5. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 50–51 (2002).  6. David Tilman, Causes, Consequences and Ethics of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 208, 210 
2000). ( 7. WILSON, supra note 5, at 50. 
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disappearance of large mammals such as mammoths and ground 
sloths 11,000 to 12,000 years ago, after the continent’s megafauna 
had survived twenty-two glacial cycles, strongly suggests that this 
mass extinction was attributable to “blitzkrieg.”8 The settlement of 
Polynesia, beginning 3,500 to 3,000 years before the present, 
introduced three domesticated species of Eurasian provenance—pigs, 
dogs, and chickens—that simultaneously dictated the arc of economic 
development on each island and spelled doom for many of the 
islands’ endemic species.9 Today, “the principal cause of biodiversity 
loss is the fragmentation, degradation, and destruction of ecosystems 
and habitats through conversion of land to economically productive 
uses, especially agriculture, forestry, mineral and fossil fuel 
extraction, and urban development.”10 
Thanks to a pair of prominent controversies over the 
constitutionality of endangered species protection under federal 
law,11 most jurists and legal scholars understand, at a minimum, the 
utilitarian rationales for protecting biodiversity.12 The law fails, 
however, to calibrate its remedies according to the severity of the 
biological threat. Perversely enough, the legal understanding of 
 
 8. See Jared M. Diamond, Quaternary Megafaunal Extinctions: Variations on a Theme by 
Paganini, 16 J. ARCHEOLOGICAL SCI. 167 (1989). See generally QUATERNARY EXTINCTIONS 
(Paul S. Martin & Richard G. Klein eds., 1984). The extent to which human colonization affected 
the ecology of North America is fiercely debated. See, e.g., TIM FLANNERY, THE ETERNAL 
FRONTIER (2001); SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN (1999); TED STEINBERG, DOWN 
O EARTH (2002). T 9. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 60 (1997). The enduring prominence 
of the words for pigs, dogs, and chickens in the Hawaiian language—pua‘a, ‘īlio, moa—pays 
linguistic homage to the centrality of animal husbandry in Polynesian culture before European 
contact. For further discussion of the effects of European contact on island culture, see SALLY 
ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI‘I 221–42 (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 2000); PATRICK 
INTON KIRCH, ON THE ROAD OF THE WINDS (2000). V 10. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) 
internal citations omitted). ( 11. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See generally Christine A. Klein, The 
Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Bradford C. Mank, 
Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on 
Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. 
REV. 723 (2002); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s 
Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 
7 ECOLOGY  L.Q. 215 (2000). 2 12. See generally WILSON, supra note 3. 
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extinction mechanisms remains frozen in time, like an insect in 
amber or, more appropriately, a cave dweller in ice. The legal 
enterprise of preventing extinctions is likelier to succeed if it 
addresses the most powerful causes of biodiversity loss today. 
Habitat destruction and alien invasive species should figure more 
prominently than overkill in the law of biodiversity protection. 
As the balance of this Article will show, however, the few laws 
that do address biodiversity loss take primary aim at overkill and the 
marketing of products derived from endangered species. Part II of 
this Article describes how the law seeks to preserve biodiversity by 
deterring overkill, habitat destruction, and the introduction of alien 
invasive species. The law imposes its clearest and harshest sanctions 
precisely where the drivers of extinction are weakest: when humans 
take conscious steps to capture or kill other living things. Part III 
concludes that the lack of congruence with conservation biology 
impedes legal efforts to preserve biodiversity. 
II. HORSE-WHIPPED: LEGAL RESPONSES TO VECTORS OF 
BIODIVERSITY LOSS 
A. Overkill 
The Edwardian excess of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness13 
retains its firm grip on the conservationist imagination. The 1916 
treaty at issue in Missouri v. Holland,14 perhaps one of the first legal 
enactments in the United States (or anywhere else in the world) to 
treat biodiversity conservation as “a national interest of very nearly 
the first magnitude,”15 focused exclusively on “the killing, capturing 
or selling . . . of . . . migratory birds.”16 At a certain level, we have 
never recovered from witnessing the spectacular slaughter of the 
Carolina parakeet and the passenger pigeon.17 These birds, 
 
 13. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902).  14. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  15. Id. at 435.  16. Id. at 431.  17. At least with respect to the passenger pigeon, this is true in a very tangible sense. By 
eliminating the principal predator of ticks in northern forests, the extermination of the passenger 
pigeon may be fairly blamed for the recent prominence of Lyme disease. See David E. Blockstein, 
Lyme Disease and the Passenger Pigeon?, 229 SCIENCE 1831 (1998); David E. Blockstein, 
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respectively the only parrot native to North America and what is 
thought to have been not only the most abundant bird but also the 
most abundant terrestrial vertebrate, became extinct at the Cincinnati 
Zoo four years apart. Martha, the last passenger pigeon, died on 
September 1, 1914; Incas, a male Carolina parakeet and the last of his 
kind, died on February 21, 1918.18 The paradigmatic act of 
converting wildlife to personal property through capture and 
slaughter19 remains the central focus of laws designed to protect 
endangered species. In the United States, section nine of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)20 flatly prohibits the taking 
of any protected species.21 “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
attempt to engage in any such conduct.”22 Section nine so 
unequivocally condemns the harvesting of protected organisms that 
few if any litigated ESA cases discuss this aspect of the statute. One 
of the most prominent reported cases involving an attempt to harvest 
a member of a protected species actually arose under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 197223 rather than the ESA.24 
Passenger Pigeons, Lyme Disease, and Us, BIRDING, Aug. 2001, at 302. See generally A. W. 
CHORGER, THE PASSENGER PIGEON (1955). S 18. See CHRISTOPHER COKINOS, HOPE IS THE THING WITH FEATHERS (2000); SCOTT 
WEIDENSAUL, THE BIRDER’S MISCELLANY (1991). See generally ERROL FULLER, EXTINCT BIRDS 
(1987). For a celebrated account of how Incas “died of grief” after the death of his mate, Lady 
Jane, see George Laycock, The Last Parakeet, AUDUBON, Mar. 1969, at 21. That these two 
extinctions coincided with what was then the most extravagant exercise in human slaughter is 
erhaps more prophetic than coincidental. p 19. See Pierson v. Post, 2 Am. Dec. 264, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Liesner v. 
Wanie, 145 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1914) (awarding ownership to the hunter who fires the shot that 
mortally wounds a hunted animal); Young v. Hichens, 115 Eng. Rep. 228, 230 (Q.B. 1844) 
(Denman, C.J., dissenting) (proposing to award possession where a fisherman has attained “actual 
power over the fish”); cf. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529–31 (1896) (recognizing the 
traditional police power of the states over hunting and fishing). See generally 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *391 (describing common law precedent before the nineteenth 
century on the ownership of wild animals); Dhammika Dharmapala, An Economic Analysis of 
Riding to Hounds”: Pierson v. Post Revisited, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 39 (2002). “ 20. Pub. L. No. 93-205 § 9, 87 Stat. 884, 893–95.  21. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).  22. Id. § 1532(19).  23. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1361–1421h (2005).  24. See United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. 
McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding ESA penalties levied against a rancher who 
shot and decapitated a gray wolf). 
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The Endangered Species Act reveals an overt bias, preventing 
direct takings of large, charismatic fauna over all other threats to 
biodiversity. The Act excludes certain insects from its protective 
aegis,25 even though they are essential to human welfare: if “land-
dwelling arthropods . . . were to disappear, humanity probably could 
not last more than a few months.”26 Moreover, even though “[t]he 
biological differences between animals and plants . . . offer no 
scientific reason for lesser protection of plants,”27 the Act 
significantly undervalues plants.28 Threatened and endangered plants 
are protected only insofar as they appear on federal land or are 
destroyed in knowing violation of state law.29 Plants receive far fewer 
critical habitat designations than do threatened and endangered 
animals.30 In so doing, the ESA perpetuates the common law’s 
baneful treatment of plants as private property merely because they 
dwell on private land.31 
Traffic in goods derived from endangered species remains the 
single act of biodiversity destruction on which international law has 
reached a punitive consensus. The Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES),32 now in its fourth decade, would 
 
 25. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000) (excluding from “[t]he term ‘endangered species’ . . . a 
species of the Class Insecta determined . . . to constitute a pest whose protection . . . would present 
n overwhelming and overriding risk to man”). a 26. WILSON, supra note 3, at 133. See generally THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSECTS AND 
THEIR ALLIES (Christopher O’Toole ed., 2003). On the concept of ecosystem services, see 
generally NATURE’S SERVICES (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997); PEAST PANEL ON BIODIVERSITY & 
ECOSYSTEMS, TEAMING WITH LIFE (1999); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic 
Returns from the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629 (1998); Janet S. Herman et al., Groundwater 
Ecosystems and the Service of Water Purification, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 479 (2001); H. A. 
Mooney et al., Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning, in GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT 
275, 282 (V.H. Heywood & R.T. Watson eds., 1995); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem 
Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens, 51 
TAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136–37 (1999). S 27. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 90 (1995).  28. See Sandra B. Zellmer & Scott A. Johnson, Biodiversity in and Around McElligot’s Pool, 
DAHO L. REV. 473, 481–82 (2002). 38 I 29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (2000).  30. See Conservation Council for Hawaii v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281 (D. Haw. 
1998) (noting that critical habitat designations covered only twenty-four of approximately seven 
ed plant species listed in 1998). hundr 31. See Holmes Rolston III, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
83, 293 (1990). 2 32. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna & Flora, Mar. 3–Apr. 
30, 1973, 20 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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represent a major step toward conserving biodiversity as long as one 
is willing to overlook the fact that it does not work. The extension of 
CITES during the 1980s to “all aspects of trade and research” in 
orchids “immediately increased the desire for the plants, raised their 
market value dramatically, and led to even more collecting of rare 
orchid species from the wild.”33 Nothing in CITES stops developers 
and farmers who would “flood [critical] habitat with a hydroelectric 
dam, log it, level the hillsides of a road, build a golf course on the 
site, or burn the jungle to the ground for agricultural purposes.”34 Not 
surprisingly, “no reliable data [show] that CITES and similar efforts 
ha[ve] reduced smuggling, saved any orchid species from extinction, 
helped protect orchid habitats, or even salvaged orchid plants    
facing . . . certain destruction.”35 Controlled harvests for profit 
outperform direct regulation under CITES in deterring the poaching 
of elephants.36 As with the American alligator,37 the elephant’s 
salvation may lie in commercialization. The focus on politically 
visible but environmentally secondary acts of overkill and 
commercial exploitation has rendered CITES tragically impotent. 
B. Alien Invasive Species 
In an increasingly interconnected world,38 human ecological 
mismanagement often takes the form of introducing an invasive 
species.39 “[M]ost invasions have a weak impact,” but on occasion 
 
 33. ERIC HANSEN, ORCHID FEVER 67 (2000).  34. Id. at 17.  35. Id. at 262–63.  36. See EDWARD BARBIER ET AL., ELEPHANTS, ECONOMICS AND IVORY 132–38 (1990); 
FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, COSTING THE EARTH 132–41 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, Has 
nternational Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). I 37. Cf. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 495 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting the successful recovery of 
the American alligator from the United States endangered species list in 1975 to a return to a 
contemporary market for its hides); Catharine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species 
Under CITES: Is It a Sustainable Alternative?, 17 U. PA. INT’L ECON. L. 461, 479–80 (1996) 
(describing the creation of a market in alligator products as a spur for the conservation of alligators 
and their habitats). See generally SARA J. SCHERR ET AL., MAKING MARKETS WORK FOR FOREST 
OMMUNITIES (2002); Pulp Friction, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2002, at 80. C 38. See, e.g., Theodore C. Foin et al., Improving Recovery Planning for Threatened and 
Endangered Species, 48 BIOSCIENCE 177, 180–81 (1998); David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying 
hreats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 608–09 (1998). T 39. See generally GEORGE W. COX, ALIEN SPECIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND HAWAII 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/3
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“an invasive species [is] capable of precipitating monumental 
changes to an ecosystem.”40 For example, introducing the Nile perch 
into Lake Victoria devastated endemic cichlids.41 Exotics have 
suppressed or eliminated native, often endemic, species in the 
Everglades, the Great Lakes, the Hawaiian Islands, and Guam.42 
Starlings, a scourge to many native birds, entered North America by 
virtue of a single man’s perverse obsession with importing all birds 
mentioned by Shakespeare.43 Feral cats, perhaps 100 million strong, 
constitute “a non-native predator that is creating havoc for certain 
native [bird] species” in the United States.44 Barnacles, mollusks, 
worms, and hydroids leaving warmer seas on a flotilla of wooden 
fragments and buoyant pumice threaten the integrity of Arctic and 
Antarctic waters.45 
(1999); CHARLES S. ELTON, ECOLOGY OF INVASIONS BY ANIMALS AND PLANTS (1958); MARK 
WILLIAMSON, BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS (1996); Andrew N. Cohen & James T. Carlton, 
Accelerating Invasion Rate in a Highly Invaded Estuary, 279 SCIENCE 555 (1998); David M. 
Lodge, Biological Invasions: Lessons for Ecology, 8 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 133 
(1993); M. Jake Vander Zanden et al., Stable Isotope Evidence for the Food Web Consequences of 
pecies Invasions in Lakes, 401 NATURE 464 (1999). S 40. Kevin Shear McCann, The Diversity-Stability Debate, 405 NATURE 228, 232 (2000). See 
generally Mark Williamson & Alastair Fitter, The Varying Success of Invaders, 77 ECOLOGY 1661 
1996). ( 41. See TIJS GOLDSCHMIDT, DARWIN’S DREAMPOND (Sherry Marx-Macdonald trans., 
1996); Peter N. Reinthal & George W. Kling, Exotic Species, Trophic Interactions and Ecosystem 
Dynamics: A Case Study of Lake Victoria, in THEORY AND APPLICATION IN FISH FEEDING 
COLOGY 296 (Deanna J. Stouder et al. eds., 1994). E 42. See, e.g., ROBERT DEVINE, ALIEN INVASION (1998); WILLIAMSON, supra note 39, at 77, 
142–43, 145–48; Julie A. Savidge, Extinction of an Island Forest Avifauna by an Introduced 
Snake, 68 ECOLOGY 660 (1987); Don C. Schmitz & Daniel Simberhoff, Biological Invasions, 
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 1997, at 33; Eric Biber, Note, Exploring Regulatory Options for 
Controlling the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
75, 380 (1999). 3 43. See ANNIE DILLARD, PILGRIM AT TINKER CREEK 37 (1974) (recounting the story of 
Eugene Schiffelin); cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, 
act I, sc. 3, ll. 218–24, in THE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE 453, 459 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor 
eds., 1988) (“[The king] Forbade my tongue to speak of Mortimer; / But I will find him when he 
lies asleep, / And in his ear I’ll hollo ‘Mortimer!’ / Nay I’ll have a starling shall be taught to speak / 
Nothing but ‘Mortimer,’ and give it him / To keep his anger still in motion.”). Efforts to reverse 
he damage by exterminating starlings have failed. See DILLARD, supra, at 38–39. t 44. James Gorman, Bird Lovers Hope to Keep Cats on a Very Short Leash, N.Y. TIMES, 
ar. 18, 2003, at F3. M 45. See generally David K. A. Barnes, Biodiversity: Invasions by Marine Life on Plastic 
Debris, 416 NATURE 808 (2002). 
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As overall biological diversity decreases, the environmental 
impact of invasive species will probably increase. If “simplified 
communities are more vulnerable to invasion,” then “we should also 
expect an increase in frequency of successful invaders as well as an 
increase in their impact.”46 Repeated cycles of extirpation and 
invasion, whether intentional or inadvertent, “can, and eventually 
will, invoke major shifts in community structure and dynamics.”47 In 
this game of ecological roulette, the disturbances with the “greatest 
ecological impact frequently incur high societal costs.”48 
Existing law offers few, if any, ways to address the problem of 
invasive species. Laws targeting the animal and plant pests49 do 
enable the Department of Agriculture to constrict the movement of 
organisms known or suspected to have an adverse effect on 
agriculture.50 Such laws, however, serve more to regulate the 
proposed releases of genetically modified crops than to provide 
broad-based authority to restrain the diffusion of invasive species.51 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA)52—a 
statute whose procedural requirements are analogous to those of the 
ESA53—provides a somewhat broader platform for legal intervention. 
One federal court of appeals has used NEPA to require a federal 
agency to address how dam construction could introduce zebra 
 
 46. McCann, supra note 40, at 233.  47. Id.  48. F. Stuart Chapin III et al., Consequences of Changing Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 234, 
239 (2000). On the economic impact of alien invasive species, see generally UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1993); David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Nonindigenous 
pecies in the United States, 50 BIOSCIENCE 53 (2000). S 49. See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa–jj (2000); Plant 
uarantine Act, id. §§ 151–67; see also 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.8–.77, 340.0–.9 (2005). Q 50. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0–.9 (2005).  51. See, e.g., Availability of Determination of Nonregulated Status for Genetically 
Engineered Canola Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,250, 55,250–51 (Nov. 4, 1994) (declining to restrict 
genetically engineered laurate canola varieties containing “sequences . . . derived from the plant 
pathogens A. tumefaciens and cauliflower mosaic virus” once it had been determined that these 
plants were no likelier than comparable, traditionally bred varieties to become weeds, to confer 
weedy characteristics on canola’s wild relatives, or to harm agriculturally beneficial organisms 
such as bees or earthworms”). “ 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70d (2000).  53. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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mussels into previously uninfested waters.54 More typically, however, 
NEPA proves impotent to curb invasions. Rejecting arguments that 
airport expansion could dramatically increase the rate at which 
commercial flights (especially from Asia) would introduce alien 
species into Maui, the Ninth Circuit declined to find a NEPA 
violation.55 That court took refuge in the vagaries of airport demand 
projections,56 the multiplicity of invasion vectors,57 and the 
impossibility of determining ex ante which species would become 
established and, among those, which would become “economic 
pests.”58 
No single country can contain the menace posed by alien invasive 
species. Within the inherently global project of biodiversity 
conservation, any hope of addressing the scourge of alien invasive 
species demands especially vigorous international cooperation.59 The 
Convention on Biological Diversity exhorts its contracting parties, 
“as far as possible and as appropriate,” to “[p]revent the introduction 
of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten 
ecosystems, habitats or species.”60 The United States’ persistent 
refusal to sign the Convention, however, effectively short-circuits 
international law’s potential to spur domestic legal change.61 
 
 54. See Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 445 (4th Cir. 
1996). See generally PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF 
LARGE DAMS (1996); Christine A. Klein, Dam Policy: The Emerging Paradigm of Restoration, 31 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,486 (2001); Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641 
1999). ( 55. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 
000). 2 56. Id. at 680.  57. See id. at 680 & n.3.  58. Id. at 681.  59. See Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: 
Three Emerging Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 329, 333–49 (2000); cf. Steven A. Wade, Stemming the Tide: A Plea for New Exotic 
Species Legislation, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343 (1995) (urging similar efforts at the 
omestic level). d 60. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on 
ersity, June 5, 1992, art. 8(h), 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD]. Biological Div 61. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding America’s 
Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989–2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
493 (2002). 
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C. Habitat Destruction 
Among the drivers of biodiversity loss, habitat destruction is by 
far the deadliest.62 Contracting the physical range of endangered 
species spurs their extinction.63 Island biogeography posits that a 
ninety-percent reduction in the area of a biological island—which 
may consist of an island in the geographic sense or merely an isolated 
patch of wildlife habitat—dictates a fifty-percent reduction in 
biological carrying capacity as measured by the number of distinct 
species that can be sustained.64 An area as large and diverse as 
Centinela, a diverse forest ridge in Ecuador, can fall victim to cacao 
cultivation.65 As typified by California’s Hetch Hetchy Reservoir,66 
Egypt’s Aswan High Dam,67 and China’s Three Gorges Dam,68 large-
scale damming can erase multiple ecological niches. Destroying large 
 
 62. See, e.g., Paul R. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, in 
BIODIVERSITY 21 (E. O. Wilson ed., 1988); P. A. Matson et al., Agricultural Intensification and 
Ecosystem Properties, 275 SCIENCE 504, 504 (1997) (describing the conversion of land to 
agricultural use as “one of the most significant human alterations to the global environment”); cf. 
Larry E. Morse et al., Native Vascular Plants, in OUR LIVING RESOURCES: REPORT TO THE 
NATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION, ABUNDANCE, AND HEALTH OF U.S. PLANTS, ANIMALS, AND 
ECOSYSTEMS 205, 208 (Edward T. Lavoe et al. eds., 1995) (describing “[h]abitat alteration and 
incompatible land use” as larger threats than overcollecting, global climate change, and sea-level 
ise). r 63. See, e.g., Rob Channell & Mark V. Lomolino, Dynamic Biogeography and Conservation 
of Endangered Species, 403 NATURE 84 (2000); John H. Lawton, Population Dynamics 
Principles, in EXTINCTION RATES 147 (John H. Lawton & Robert M. May eds., 1995); Bruce A. 
Wilcox & Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Fragmentation on Extinction, 
25 AM. NATURALIST 879 (1985). 1 64. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MACARTHUR & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND 
BIOGEOGRAPHY (1967); Daniel Simberloff, Experimental Zoogeography of Islands: Effects of 
Island Size, 57 ECOLOGY 629 (1976); Donald R. Whitehead & Claris E. Jones, Small Islands and 
the Equilibrium Theory of Island Biogeography, 23 EVOLUTION 171 (1969). The most elementary 
mathematical formula expressing this relationship is N = k · A-.27, where N represents the number of 
species, A represents the area, and k represents an empirically determined constant. For a skeptical 
assessment of island biogeography’s strongest claims, see Charles C. Mann, Extinction: Are 
cologists Crying Wolf?, 253 SCIENCE 736 (1991). E 65. See C.H. Dodson & A.H. Gentry, Biological Extinction in Western Ecuador, 78 ANNALS 
MO. BOTANICAL GARDEN 273 (1991); see also WILSON, supra note 3, at 243 (arguing that the 
name Centinela “deserves to be synonymous with the silent hemorrhaging of biological 
iversity”). d 66. See, e.g., RICHARD WHITE, IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN 412–15 
1991). ( 67. See, e.g., TOM LITTLE, HIGH DAM AT ASWAN (1965); Gilbert F. White, The 
nvironmental Effects of the High Dam at Aswan, 30:7 ENV’T 5 (1988). E 68. See, e.g., VACLAV SMIL, CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1993). 
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chunks of the earth’s physical infrastructure within a temporal frame 
that by geological standards is effectively instantaneous significantly 
accelerates the rate of evolutionary change attributable to humans. 
1. Private Land 
The prohibition against the taking of any species protected by the 
ESA69 has been interpreted to extend to the destroying or 
significantly modifying critical habitat.70 The Supreme Court’s first 
ESA decision reflected the Justices’ understanding of the potential of 
habitat destruction to disrupt breeding and eliminate indispensable 
food sources.71 As the example of orchids illustrates, however, 
similar sophistication has not migrated from American law to the 
international sphere. The use of section nine against habitat 
destruction triggers other provisions of the ESA. Section ten 
authorizes incidental take permits upon submission and approval of a 
habitat conservation plan (HCP).72 In turn, approval of an HCP 
triggers the federal government’s obligation under section seven to 
“insure [sic] that any action” it undertakes “is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of” critical 
habitat.73 This provision has been interpreted as imposing an 
affirmative obligation to pursue an active species conservation 
policy.74  
 
 69. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).  70. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2005); Babbitt v. Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995); see 
also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (2000) (authorizing the designation of “critical habitat” for 
ndangered or threatened species). e 71. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162, 166 n.16 (1978).  72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).  73. Id. § 1536(a)(2); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2005); Friends of Endangered Species, 
Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 984–85 (9th Cir. 1985); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. 
Supp. 2d 1274, 1286 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Section 4(d) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), may also be 
used to establish the functional equivalent of HCPs for threatened species. See Robert L. Fischman 
& Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative 
Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 94–109 
2002). ( 74. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 
1984); Fla. Key Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222, 1237–38 (S.D. Fla. 1994); J.B. Ruhl, Section 
7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1137 (1995). 
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Before HCPs became a familiar fixture of ESA enforcement, 
developers and farmers facing potential section nine liability often 
resorted to the “scorched earth” technique of preemptively clearing 
wildlife habitat.75 Clinton-era enforcement transformed the 
“previously obscure and rarely used permit provision” of section ten 
into “the centerpiece of . . . endangered species and ecosystem 
conservation policy.”76 Threatened section nine liability became 
merely “the opening gambit in a prolonged bargaining process.”77 
HCPs today represent “perhaps the most visible example of a 
consensus-based, multi-stakeholder approach to resource 
management.”78 
The strategy has its limits. Like the ESA as a whole, HCPs 
proceed species by species, and only after an individual species has 
 
 75. Michael J. Bean, Overcoming Unintended Consequences of Endangered Species 
Regulation, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 409, 415 (2002) (quoting NAT’L ASS’N OF HOMEBUILDERS, 
DEVELOPER’S GUIDE TO ENDANGERED SPECIES REGULATION 109 (1996)); see also George 
Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law?: The Recent 
Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247, 297 
(1987). Scholars debate just how inflexible section nine is in practice. Compare Christopher A. 
Cole, Species Conservation in the United States: The Ultimate Failure of the Endangered Species 
Act and Other Land Use Laws, 72 B.U. L. REV. 343, 350–54 (1992) (arguing that the Act, at least 
as enforced without resort to HCPs, is unduly harsh and ineffective), with Karin P. Sheldon, 
Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998) (arguing that landowners historically did not treat their chances of 
receiving incidental take permits under section ten as sufficiently serious to warrant the making of 
HCP proposals). For one account of the feared economic consequences of the listing of an 
endangered species (the northern spotted owl) and the designation of its critical habitat, see Seattle 
udubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1403–04 (9th Cir. 1996). A 76. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970 (2003). For details of how 
section ten arose from efforts to reconcile preservation of the remaining habitat of the endangered 
Mission Blue butterfly with commercial development on San Bruno Mountain on the San 
Francisco peninsula, see Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982–83 
(9th Cir. 1985); S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 10 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31–32 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2872–73; MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS 
UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 
52–55 (1991); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco) Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1037 
(2003); Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions 
or Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 375–76 (1996). f 77. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance 
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 317 (1999). For further discussion of 
environmental law as a process of public-sector negotiation among interested groups, see David A. 
Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
5. 3 78. Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 155, 194 (2000). 
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begun to decline. Despite well-founded doubts about the territorial 
and institutional suitability of states as participants in ecosystem 
management,79 state-law restrictions on land use can enhance the 
effectiveness of federal HCPs.80 California law facilitates natural 
community conservation plans that provide “large-scale, multi-
species equivalents of HCPs.”81 That state’s active intervention is 
crucial because it is home to the California floristic province, the 
hottest of biological “hotspots” in the continental United States.82 
Ultimately, however, the ESA only indirectly addresses habitat loss 
and altogether ignores “other causes” of biodiversity loss “such as the 
invasion of exotic species and air and water pollution.”83 The Act as a 
whole falls far short of “promot[ing] the conservation of ecosystems 
on the geographic scale necessary to promote biodiversity     
generally.”84 
2. Public Land 
Although “[t]he Endangered Species Act of 1973 was motivated 
in part by the need to . . . regulat[e] beyond the limited confines of 
federal land,”85 a significant degree of habitat conservation takes 
 
 79. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, 
m, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 216 (2002). and Dynamis 80. See Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?, 
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696–97 & n.7 (1997); 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2000) (authorizing cooperative 
species conservation agreements between states and the federal government); cf. A. Dan Tarlock, 
Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995) (asserting that biodiversity conservation will 
ot succeed absent state-federal cooperation). n 81. A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,529, 10,539 (2002) [hereinafter Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation]; see also Natural 
Communities Conservation Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800–40 (West 2003). See 
generally John M. Gaffin, Can We Conserve California’s Threatened Fisheries Through Natural 
Community Planning?, 27 ENVTL. L. 791 (1997). For further discussion of the role of state tort law 
in biodiversity conservation, see A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: 
hat Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1993). W 82. See Ryan Carlsbeek et al., Patterns of Molecular Evolution and Diversification in a 
iversity Hotspot: The California Floristic Province, 12 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 1021 (2003). Biod 83. Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation, supra note 81, at 10,537; see also Elaine K. Harding 
et al., The Scientific Foundations of Habitat Conservation Plans: A Quantitative Assessment, 15 
ONSERVATION BIOLOGY 488 (2000). C 84. Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation, supra note 81, at 10,540.  85. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 494 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Davina Kari Kaile, Note, 
Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect 
Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1993); 
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place under the aegis of public land management. The law of public 
lands rests on the primary premise of “multiple use,” defined as a 
range of uses “including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, 
minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific 
and historical values.”86 Because “[m]ultiple use posits that all uses 
from commodity extraction and production to biodiversity are equal,” 
this principle “both supports and hinders biodiversity conservation.”87 
When it first appeared, the concept of “multiple use” represented a 
substantial improvement in federal land management policy. 
“[I]ncreased competition for forage” among cattle and sheep ranchers 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to 
overgrazing, diminished profits, and open hostility among forage 
competitors.”88 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA)89 explicitly adopted two statutory principles: 
“multiple use” for recreation, range, timber, mineral extraction, 
wildlife and fish habitat, and natural, scenic, scientific, and historical 
uses;90 and “sustained yield” of renewable resources.91 At the same 
time, FLPMA retained “first priority” for existing grazing-permit 
holders as long as federal land-use planning continued to leave land 
“available for domestic livestock grazing.”92 
Although a statutory commitment to multiple use may 
theoretically “provide[] the legal foundation for a management 
decision to preserve biodiversity,”93 disputes over federal land 
management expose a bias favoring commercialization over 
cf. Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281 (D. Haw. 1998) 
(invalidating a decision not to designate critical habitat insofar as that decision was based solely on 
a claim that some of the species at issue were located on private land, without determining whether 
ecision not to designate might be appropriate when a species exists solely on private land). a d 86. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000); see also id. § 1701(a)(7) (directing that “management [of 
public land] be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by 
aw”). l 87. Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation, supra note 81, at 10,540–41.  88. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 732 (2000). See generally DEBRA L. 
DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGELAND REVISITED: REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM PUBLIC LANDS 
O CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY (Gordon Morris Bakhen et al. eds., 1999). T 89. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 
2000)). ( 90. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000).  91. Id. § 1702(h).  92. Id. § 1752(c) (2000).  93. Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation, supra note 81, at 10,541. 
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conservation.94 When the Interior Department tried in 1995 to 
“accelerate restoration” of rangelands by making its managerial 
approach “more compatible with ecosystem management,”95 
incumbent ranchers argued in response that the Department was 
legally obliged to safeguard livestock interests’ reliance on the 
perpetuation of grazing privileges.96 This argument ran squarely 
against an explicit statutory proviso that neither “the creation of a 
grazing district [n]or the issuance of a permit . . . shall . . . create any 
right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.”97 
Other decisions have demonstrated the willingness of federal land 
management agencies to favor grazing and other historically 
privileged land uses. A federal district court was forced to remind 
federal land managers in 1985 that grazing “[p]ermittees must be kept 
under a sufficiently real threat of cancellation or modification in 
order to adequately protect the public lands from overgrazing or other 
forms of mismanagement.”98 In spite of its statutory mandate to 
maintain “final control and decisionmaking authority over livestock 
grazing practices on the public lands,” the federal government had all 
but ceded jurisdiction over grazing permits.99 
On the whole, federal land management policy concentrates its 
habitat preservation efforts on tracts designated as “wilderness.” “A 
wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own 
works dominate the landscape, is . . . an area where the earth and its 
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a 
visitor who does not remain.”100 Unlike other public lands, wilderness 
areas fulfill their function solely by virtue of remaining “in their 
 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117, 128 (Idaho 2001) (arguing that reservation 
of water for a wildlife refuge would unfairly “subordinate” rights to “water intended to be stored 
and regulated by colossal federal projects for the past 98 years” for the primary purpose of 
reclamation”). “ 95. See Grazing Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9900–06 (Feb. 
 1995) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4, 1780, 4100). 22, 96. See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 741 (2000).  97. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2000); see Public Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 741–42.  98. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 871 (E.D. Cal. 1985).  99. Id. at 871; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901–08 (2000).  100. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000); cf. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 
1182, 1192 (D. Or. 1998) holding that “the explicit ‘protect and enhance’ language of” the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act “requires that watersheds be maintained in a primitive condition and the 
waters kept unpolluted”). 
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natural condition.”101 Wilderness preservation helps ensure “that an 
increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and 
growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify” the entire 
physical surface of the earth.102 
Cold and high-elevation wilderness areas, however, cannot anchor 
a comprehensive and effective biodiversity program.103 Biodiverse 
“hot spots,” rich in species, typically live up to their name: most such 
locales lie in the tropics.104 The National Park Service—which is 
directed to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects 
and the wild life” in the most spectacular federal lands105—was 
designed to preserve geological wonders, not to serve broader 
ecological purposes.106 Wilderness policy, in microcosm, reveals the 
weakness of the overall legal response to biodiversity loss. Laws 
designed to prevent biodiversity loss behave like a twisted version of 
Wee Willie Keeler—aiming environmental law “where they ain’t.”107 
III. A MODEST AGENDA FOR FORESTALLING APOCALYPSE NOW 
This brief survey shows how the law has failed to keep pace with 
the scientific understanding of biodiversity loss. Advances in the field 
of conservation biology have had little or no legal impact. Federal 
courts routinely decline to treat innovations in conservation biology 
 
 101. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2000).  102. Id.  103. See Jonathan S. Adams et al., Biodiversity: Our Precious Heritage, in PRECIOUS 
HERITAGE: THE STATUS OF BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 17 (Bruce A. Stein et al. eds., 
000); Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation, supra note 81, at 10,542. 2 104. See John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots 
Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1157–58 (2001); Norman Myers, The Biodiversity Challenge: 
Expanded Hot-Spots Analysis, 10 ENVIRONMENTALIST 243 (1990); Norman Myers, Threatened 
iotas: “Hot Spots” in Tropical Forests, 8 ENVIRONMENTALIST 187 (1988). B 105. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (directing the Service to “provide for the enjoyment of the same in 
such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations”); see also Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 
. 1999) 106. See RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A 
ISTORY 2–3 (1997). H 107. Wee Willie Keeler amassed a career batting average of .341 from 1892 to 1910 by hitting 
the ball “where they ain’t.” See Geoffrey C. Ward, Our Game: Beginnings to 1900, in BASEBALL: 
AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 52 (1994). 
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as “a necessary element of diversity analysis.”108 In a case assaulting 
the government’s failure to consider “population dynamics, species 
turnover, patch size, recolonization problems, fragmentation 
problems, edge effects, and island biogeography,”109 the Seventh 
Circuit ultimately held that these concepts of conservation biology 
were uncertain in application and that the Forest Service could 
therefore ignore them in managing national forests.110 Even a valid 
“general theory,” the court held, “does not translate into a 
management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete situation.”111 A 
federal district court similarly declined to endorse specific techniques 
for managing “distinct geographic ecosystems . . . inhabited by 
grizzly bears.”112 That court seemed to treat complexity as a legal 
excuse in its own right. The possibility that “science or 
circumstances” might change, the court reasoned, relieved the agency 
of any obligation to prepare an “exhaustively detailed recovery 
plan.”113 As a result, the court rejected a claim that the Endangered 
Species Act required “linkage zones between ecosystems inhabited 
by grizzlies.”114 
Cases of this nature suggest that conservation biology, until 
further notice, will not govern American environmental law until 
federal land management agencies and the agencies charged with 
implementing the Endangered Species Act decide that it does. In the 
meanwhile, federal judges take frequent refuge in the maxim that “a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential” when an 
agency “is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at 
the frontiers of science.”115 Administrative and judicial passivity bode 
 
 108. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 620 (7th Cir. 1995).  109. Id. at 618.  110. Id. at 622–23.  111. Id. at 623.  112. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 106 (D.D.C. 1995).  113. Id. at 107.  114. Id. at 109–10.  115. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); 
see also Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); 
id. at 705–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (stating that “[t]he rationale for deference is particularly strong when the [agency] is 
evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 
337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[I]n an area characterized by scientific and technological uncertainty 
. . . this court must proceed with particular caution, avoiding all temptation to direct the agency in a 
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ill for biodiversity conservation. An even more potent driver of 
ecological ruin and evolutionary change may lurk in global climate 
change, whose consequences defy description, much less 
prediction.116 The failure to coordinate the law with scientific 
knowledge threatens to consign yet another environmental crisis 
requiring transnational cooperation to the perdition of zero-sum 
politics.117 
In the meanwhile, “[t]hose of us who love nature, and who would 
like to ensure that nature persists for future generations to love, need 
to think about saving ordinary places and ordinary things.”118 Without 
abandoning the admittedly implausible prospect of comprehensively 
reconfiguring domestic and international environmental law to 
address habitat destruction and alien invasive species, advocates of 
biodiversity conservation can pursue a more modest agenda for 
reform. First, international policymakers should develop a joint 
framework for the regulation of commercial bioprospecting. 
International coordination on commercial exploitation of biodiversity 
can improve the very process of collecting rare specimens. If even 
casual hiking affects the distribution and population of wildlife,119 
choice between rational alternatives.”); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
77 (D.D.C. 2000). 1 116. See Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate 
Change Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37 (2003); Robert L. Peters, Conservation 
of Biological Diversity in the Face of Climate Change, in GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY 15, 21–22 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy eds., 1992); Terry L. Root et al., 
Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants, 421 NATURE 57 (2003); cf. Herman 
E. Daly, Ecological Economics, 254 SCIENCE 358 (1991) (suggesting that global warming can 
threaten even homo sapiens by destabilizing the human food supply). See generally Osvaldo E. 
Sala et al., Global Biodiversity Scenarios for the Year 2100, 287 SCIENCE 1770 (2000) (describing 
the potential ecological impact of land use, proliferation of exotic species, climate change, and the 
continued escalation of CO2 and N2 levels). For speculation on the possibility of legal recourse 
against human agents of climate change, see Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, 421 
ATURE 891 (2003). N 117. See generally NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 232–44 (2002); 
MATTHEW PATERSON, GLOBAL WARMING AND GLOBAL POLITICS (1996); Peter Newell, Who 
“CoPed” Out in Kyoto? An Assessment of the Third Conference of the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 7 ENVTL. POL. 153 (1998); Peter Newell & Matthew Paterson, A 
Climate for Business: Global Warming, the State and Capital, 5 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 679 
1998). ( 118. Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & 
OL’Y J. 3, 4 (2000). P 119. See Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 669–70 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding snowmobiling 
restrictions in Voyageurs National Park on the basis of biological opinions that showed adverse 
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purposeful bioprospecting leaves a dramatically deeper human 
footprint. Bioprospectors, anthropologists, or journalists may even 
engage in deliberate misconduct.120 Even though the collapse of 
global fisheries has shaken public confidence in official efforts to 
achieve “sustainability,”121 bitter experience teaches that the lack of 
coordination would be worse. The slash-and-collect approach of 
Victorian orchid harvesters would probably prevail.122 Rationalized 
harvesting would limit instances of “the wonderfully unusual 
accomplishment of discovering and eradicating in the same instant a 
new species.”123 
In addition, the international community should facilitate the 
professionalization of parataxonomy,124 especially in the developing 
world. Millions of species await collection and classification by 
properly trained field biologists. Transnational cooperation can help 
translate ethnobiological knowledge into terms understood by the 
global scientific community. Its economic impact is simple and 
immediate. Scientific research, to put it bluntly, generates jobs.125 
The science of systematics is so labor-intensive that the task of 
classifying ten million species would require twenty-five thousand 
impacts from snowmobiling on gray wolves). See generally David S. May, Tourism and the 
Environment, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57 (1999). Realizations of this sort have motivated 
the establishment of the National Wildlife Preservation System within the United States. See 16 
 1132 (2000). U.S.C. § 120. See PATRICK TIERNEY, DARKNESS IN EL DORADO: HOW SCIENTISTS AND JOURNALISTS 
EVASTATED THE AMAZON (2000). D 121. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN (1998); CARL SAFINA, SONG FOR A 
BLUE OCEAN (1998); LISA SPEER ET AL., NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HOOK, LINE & SINKING 
(1997); H. Scott Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, 1 J.L. & ECON. 110 (1958); 
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. 
ECON. 124 (1954); Bob Holmes, Biologists Sort the Lessons of the Fisheries Collapse, 264 
SCIENCE 1252 (1994); Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and 
Conservation: Lessons from History, 260 SCIENCE 17 (1993); Alison Rieser, Property Rights and 
Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813 
(1997); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 
(1955); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 
0 ENVTL. L. 241, 247–49 (2000). 3 122. See HAROLD KOOPOWITZ & HILARY KAYE, PLANT EXTINCTION: A GLOBAL CRISIS 
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professional lifetimes.126 Whether framed as cooperative 
bioprospecting or north-to-south technology transfer for the 
enrichment of parataxonomy, commercially oriented initiatives 
satisfy the Convention on Biological Diversity’s exhortation that the 
international community should “adopt economically and socially 
sound measures . . . as incentives” to conserve biodiversity and to 
contribute to its sustainable development.127 
Willingness to pursue a more modest agenda, however, does not 
weaken the need for more aggressive conservation measures. In situ 
preservation remains the only effective way to save biodiversity. The 
larger the tract of land set aside for conservation, the better.128 Zoos, 
gene banks, and other ex situ strategies fall far short of the mark.129 
Despite consuming a significant portion of the capital expended on 
conservation, ex situ efforts have protected a trivial amount of 
biodiversity.130 Ex situ conservation cannot preserve the adaptive and 
evolutionary value of individual species, let alone entire 
ecosystems.131 By introducing criteria designed to suit human tastes 
and preferences, ex situ preservation exerts selective pressure on 
those species that are targeted for protection.132 Only in situ 
conservation can effectively preserve the “conditions where genetic 
resources exist with ecosystems and natural habitats,” or at least the 
surroundings where “domesticated or cultivated species . . . have 
developed their distinctive properties.”133 
 
 126. WILSON, supra note 3, at 318.  127. CBD, supra note 60, art. 11.  128. See Karkkainen, supra note 10, at 10–12.  129. See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New 
iscourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 54–57 (2000). D 130. See Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 
5 J.L. & ECON. 199, 203 (1992). 3 131. See, e.g., EDWARD C. WOLF, ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 44 (1987); Matthew B. 
Hamilton, Ex Situ Conservation of Wild Plant Species: Time to Reassess the Genetic Assumptions 
and Implications of Seed Banks, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 39 (1994); G. Ledyard Stebbins, Why 
Should We Conserve Species and Wildlands?, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF NATURE CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 453, 463 (Peggy L. 
Fiedler & Subodh K. Jain eds., 1992); Mark A. Urbanski, Note, Chemical Prospecting, 
Biodiversity Conservation, and the Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property 
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/3
p 12 Chen book pages.doc  3/29/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:12 
 
 
Finally, the academic community bears a singularly immense 
responsibility to educate the public. A country whose citizens lead 
the developed world in rejecting the Darwinian account of natural 
history134 is hardly well equipped to reorient the primary focus of 
biodiversity conservation from preventing overkill to preserving 
habitat and slowing the flux of alien species. Ours, after all, is a legal 
culture where at least one member of the highest court in the land 
condemns habitat preservation because it allegedly “imposes 
unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but 
upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national 
zoological use.”135 The same jurist even derives perverse pleasure 
from mocking “the much beloved secular legend of the Monkey 
Trial” and thereby delivers rhetorical succor to the enemies of 
biological enlightenment.136 
Among creation myths vying to satisfy the human need for a 
compelling story of origins, especially in an emotionally challenging 
“age of globalization,” “none is more solid and unifying for the 
species than evolutionary history.”137 No other story of human 
beginnings boasts a more expansive narrative scope or enjoys greater 
scientific support.138 Realigning environmental law with the scientific 
understanding of biodiversity loss produces its own epiphany, its own 
spiritually satisfying path toward detecting an “echo of the infinite, a 
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.”139 
“[I]ntense spiritual feelings” arise from the “unfathomable 
complexity and . . . sublime beauty” of the biosphere at its fullest and 
 
 134. See Eugenie C. Scott, Antievolution and Creationism in the United States, 26 ANN. REV. 
ANTHRO. 263, 263–64 (1997) (reporting a 1996 survey conducted by the National Science Board 
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n evolution (28 percent)”). i 135. Babbitt v. Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  136. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
rom denial of cert.). f 137. WILSON, supra note 5, at 133.  138. See David Christian, The Case for “Big History,” 2 J. WORLD HIST. 223, 235 (1991) 
(describing history, at least if studied across the whole of time, “as a form of modern ‘creation 
yth’” that “reflects the best attempts of our society to answer questions about origins”). m 139. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897), 
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1009 (1997). 
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most diverse.140 Training the law to harness, perchance to halt, the 
horses of our ecological apocalypse should help us recapture the 
“beauty and mystery that seized us at the beginning.”141 
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